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Title: Why (a Form of) Function Indeterminacy is Still a Problem for Biomedicine, 
and How Seeing Functional Items as Components of Mechanisms Can Solve it 
 
Abstract: During the 1990s, many philosophers wrestled with the problem of function 
indeterminacy. Although interest in the problem has waned, I argue that solving the 
problem is of value for biomedical research and practice. This is because a solution to the 
problem is required in order to specify rigorously the conditions under which a given 
item is “dysfunctional.” In the following I revisit a solution developed originally by 
Neander (1995), which uses functional analysis to solve the problem. I situate her 
solution in the framework of mechanistic explanation and suggest two improvements.  
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1. Biomedicine Needs a Solution to the Problem of Indeterminacy 
 
The central organizing principle of biomedical intervention is that of fixing dysfunctional 
items. This is not to say that biomedical practitioners do not do other things besides fixing 
dysfunctions. Sometimes, instead of fixing dysfunctional items, practitioners simply 
remove those items from the body, or they supplement their activity, or they inhibit their 
activity so as to restore proper physiological functioning. Yet the idea of fixing 
dysfunctions is an organizing principle of biomedicine in the sense that it illuminates 
most of the other sorts of goals that biomedical practitioners have (with the exception of 
goals such as cosmetic surgery, or pain relief during labor). For example, when 
practitioners choose to remove, supplement, or inhibit dysfunctional items, rather than fix 
them, they typically do so because of various limitations on the ability to fix them. 
Moreover, the idea of repairing dysfunctions is also an organizing principle because it 
works as a heuristic for biomedical research. This is because researchers often do not feel 
that they entirely understand a pathological process until they know what they would 
need to do, in theory, in order to fix it.  
 
Biomedicine is limited in its ability to fix dysfunctions because of various epistemic, 
technical, and sociopolitical obstacles. At least one of those obstacles, however, is 
conceptual, or, if you will, “metaphysical.” The ability to carry out the ideal of fixing 
dysfunctions requires, in the first place, that we are able to clearly articulate the 
conditions under which an item is functional and the conditions under which it is 
dysfunctional. Yet this is precisely what, according to one version of the function 
indeterminacy problem, is precluded (e.g., Dretske 1986; Neander 1995). Consider a 
well-worn but lucid example: the heart beats. In doing so, it circulates the blood. In doing 
so, it brings nutrients to cells and removes waste. In doing so, it contributes to survival 
and, ultimately, to reproductive success. Yet which of these activities constitutes the 
function of the heart? Any one of them would be licensed by standard theories of 
biological function, and in particular, theories that tie function to selection history or 
current adaptiveness (see Garson 2015). (I will refer to both groups of theories as 
“evolutionary” theories of function because they tie function to evolutionary 
considerations, despite the fact that one set of theories focuses more on history and 
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another on present-day activity. I am not here concerned with Cummins-type (or “causal 
role”) functions, in which the function of a trait simply consists in its contribution to 
some systemic capacity of interest to an investigator. This theory will come into play 
later. I will also justify this exclusion later.) The problem arises most clearly for 
evolutionary theories, though a version of the problem could arise for causal role theories 
as well. I will refer to this as the “hierarchical” version of the problem of functional 
indeterminacy for reasons to be explained in the next section.  
 
Here is where the problem comes in for biomedicine. Suppose that one succumbs to the 
temptation of pluralism, and asserts that there is no principled and context-independent 
way of selecting one of those descriptions of the heart’s function (e.g., in terms of 
beating, circulating blood, bringing nutrients to cells, etc.) as the uniquely correct 
description of its function. Any of those activities, one might hold, may constitute the 
heart’s “function,” depending on factors such as disciplinary interest, convention, or 
personal predilection. The pluralist solution runs into trouble when we realize that these 
different function ascriptions can conflict with one another. Specifically, it is possible for 
the heart to carry out one of these activities and not the other. For example, suppose that 
the heart beats, but, due to a massive brain hemorrhage, the heart cannot circulate enough 
blood to keep the individual alive. Should we say that the heart is failing to perform its 
function of circulating blood (or not at the appropriate rate)? Or should we say, instead, 
that the heart is functioning successfully because it is performing its function of beating, 
despite the fact that, due to the hemorrhage, the activity is not associated with its normal 
contribution to survival?  
 
Intuitively – if you and I share the same intuitions – we should say that the heart is 
functioning. It just cannot make its normal contribution to fitness because some other 
item is dysfunctional, namely, the ruptured artery. After all, the heart is only “doing its 
job,” but the artery isn’t doing its job. Deciding whether or not the heart is functioning in 
this situation is like trying to locate blame in a large corporation. But in saying this, we 
are privileging one activity over another as having a greater claim to constituting the 
function of the heart: the claim that the function of the heart is to beat is “privileged” in a 
way that the claim that the function of the heart is to circulate blood is not. Moreover, it 
seems to be privileged in some principled, context-independent way. This is precisely 
what the pluralist solution forbids. So, how can we justify this assertion that the one 
function ascription (“the heart beats”) is more correct than another (“the heart circulates 
blood”)?  
 
Keep in mind that our solution – that in the case of the hemorrhage, the heart is 
“functional” and not “dysfunctional” – is not only intuitively correct. To maintain 
otherwise would be counterproductive or contrary to the needs to biomedicine. This is 
because, when we say that an item is dysfunctional, we indicate that the item in question 
is a prime target for direct biomedical intervention, such as repair or replacement. But if 
the heart cannot circulate blood effectively because of a ruptured artery in the brain, we 
presumably want to fix the artery, not the heart! 
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As a consequence, any attempt to articulate clearly the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional entails, as a necessary condition, a solution to the problem of function 
indeterminacy. In other words, if one can articulate clearly the conditions under which an 
item is dysfunctional, then one can use those conditions to state, in a principled and 
context-independent way, which of the multiple function ascriptions legitimized by 
evolutionary considerations is uniquely correct (or at least one can reduce the plurality of 
reasonable function ascriptions down to a small number of equally correct ascriptions). 
Conversely, if one possesses a solution to the problem of function indeterminacy, then 
(presumably) one could apply that to resolve such conflicts in the biomedical context. 
How shall we proceed?  
 
In the following I will do three things. First, I will revisit a solution proposed by Neander 
(1995). In short, in her view, in order to identify the (determinate) function of any given 
item, we can utilize the framework of functional analysis. The (determinate) function of 
an item is identified with its “most specific function,” which turns out to be its causal role 
within a certain mechanism. Next, I will describe that solution using the framework of 
multi-level mechanistic explanation as it has been developed over the last two decades 
(Section 2). Finally, I suggest two improvements to that solution (Section 3), one minor 
and one more substantial. The first is to replace talk of the “most specific function” with 
the “differentiated function” of the item. The second is to draw attention to two 
dimensions of indeterminacy, a “horizontal” dimension and a “vertical” dimension, and 
to suggest how mechanistic modeling can resolve both types.  
 
 
2. Seeing Functional Items as Components in a Nested Hierarchy of Mechanisms 
 
The central idea of the solution to the problem of indeterminacy that I will present here 
advances Neander’s (1995) solution by anchoring it more firmly within the literature of 
the new mechanism tradition (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Glennan 1996, 2005; 
MDC 2000; Craver 2001; Darden 2006; Craver and Darden 2013). It then develops it in 
two ways. In short, we can solve the indeterminacy problem by construing the functional 
item as a component within a mechanism, or, more precisely, within a nested hierarchy of 
mechanisms.  
 
More specifically, the hierarchical version of the problem of indeterminacy stems from 
the fact that for any given item and any given function, there is a hierarchy of activities 
that explains why the performance of the function is (or was) associated with some 
biological advantage for the organism. Quite fortunately – and this is the key to solving it 
– that hierarchy of activities is mirrored by a corresponding hierarchy of mechanisms. 
Moreover, these mechanisms are nested, one within the other. For example, suppose A 
and Aʹ′ are two activities “adjacent” to one another on the functional hierarchy, where Aʹ′ 
is “higher” than A (see Figure 1). Suppose A is the activity of beating, and Aʹ′ the activity 
of circulating blood. On the corresponding mechanistic hierarchy, there is a mechanism, 
M, for A, and another mechanism, Mʹ′, for Aʹ′. In this case (and simplifying 
tremendously), M is comprised of the heart, and Mʹ′ is comprised of the circulatory 
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system, which includes, in addition to the heart, the brain and blood vessels. M and Mʹ′ 
are nested in the sense that M can be construed as a component part of Mʹ′. 
 
 
Figure 1. Functional and mechanistic hierarchies 
 
 
With this framework in mind, we can solve the function indeterminacy problem by 
identifying the function of any particular item as its differentiated contribution to the 
activity of the mechanism of which it is a component – that is, the mechanism in which it 
is most “immediately” contained. For example, in this framework, it would be correct to 
say that the function of the heart is to beat, since that is its specific contribution to the 
activity Aʹ′ (blood circulation) of the mechanism Mʹ′ (circulatory system) in which it is 
“immediately” contained. To put the point differently, and somewhat more methodically: 
in order to identify the function of an item, we first construct our functional hierarchy. 
This hierarchy will be determined, in part, by our theory of function and in part by the 
empirical facts. We then construct a corresponding mechanistic hierarchy. Then, 
beginning at the uppermost level of the mechanistic hierarchy, and we work our way 
“downwards,” level by level, until we reach the level at which the item in question 
emerges as an unanalyzed component (Neander 1995, 129). This is the “bottom-out” 
level as far as our analysis is concerned. Then the indeterminate function of the item can 
be rendered determinate by identifying it with the contribution that the item makes to the 
activity of the mechanism of which it is a component.  
 
The same solution can, if necessary, be cast in a more historical vein, for example, in 
terms of the selected effects theory of function. The solution simply requires that instead 
of analyzing the trait’s current contribution to fitness, we attempt to reconstruct, 
historically, how it may have contributed to fitness in the past. As noted above, I do not 
wish to take a stance, in this context, on which evolutionary approach to function is 
preferable, the approach that focuses on history or the approach that focuses on current-
day performance (and, within each set of theories, which version of the theory is 
superior). The point is that the mechanistic framework could be adapted easily to suit the 
needs of either.  
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It would be natural at this point for one to wonder how this solution differs from the 
Cummins’ type causal role theory of function (Cummins 1975), or its more recent 
variants, such as the mechanistic causal role theory of function (e.g., Craver 2001, 2013). 
In Cummins’ theory, the function of a trait consists in its contribution to some systemic 
capacity picked out by an investigator. In the mechanistic causal role version of this 
theory, the function of a trait consists in its contribution, in tandem with the other parts of 
the system, to a systemic capacity of interest, and the whole system is described using the 
framework of mechanistic explanation. Isn’t what I’ve presented just the solution that the 
Cummins-type theory, on its own, would entail?  
 
The main difference is that in the view presented here, the function of the item is first 
identified by utilizing an evolutionary framework, and specifically, by considering the 
item in light of its selection history or its current contribution to fitness. That 
evolutionary framework provides a rationale for selecting a certain hierarchy of activities 
(pumping -> circulating blood -> bringing nutrients to cells -> helping creature survive 
and reproduce) as constituting the heart’s (indeterminate) function. (Of course, which 
specific sequence of activities we identify depends partly on which specific theory of 
function we select within that family of theories, a topic on which, again, I wish to 
remain neutral at present.) A problem with this solution, of course, is that it creates the 
hierarchical version of the problem of function indeterminacy. We then apply a 
mechanistic framework to resolve that problem in a principled way. The hierarchy of 
functions that has been identified by evolutionary considerations is converted into a 
framework for identifying the relevant hierarchy of mechanisms, and we then look for the 
function of the item qua mechanistic causal role. Mechanistic considerations merely help 
us to make the transition from an indeterminately-specified function to a determinately-
specified one. They do not supplant evolutionary considerations.  
 
Even if this solution differs from the causal role theory of functions, one might wonder 
why the solution offered here is preferable. Why not just drop the evolutionary 
framework and go straightaway to a Cummins-type framework? The reason is that 
utilizing the evolutionary framework allows us to avoid certain recalcitrant problems 
associated with the Cummins-type theory, in particular, the problems of overbreadth and 
normativity. The first is the classic problem of overbreadth (e.g., Millikan 1989, 294; 
Kitcher 1993, 390). In Cummins’ view, as in the mechanistic causal role view, the choice 
of a “top level” function for a given system is largely a matter of caprice. (I mean this in 
the sense that there is no objective, mind-independent fact of the matter regarding what 
the “top-level” function of any given system is, and not in the sense that it is somehow 
unmotivated or unjustifiable in any given case.) A consequence of this is that Cummins’ 
framework licenses wildly counterintuitive function ascriptions (for example, Cummins’ 
(1975, 752) own example that the function of the appendix could be to produce 
appendicitis. Incidentally, he raises this as a problem for Nagel’s theory, but does not 
suggest how his own theory would resolve it). Alternatively, theories of function that tie 
function to evolutionary considerations have the implication that there is an objective fact 
of the matter regarding what the function of a given item (albeit indeterminate) actually 
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is, and it yields function ascriptions that are (typically) in line with biologically-informed 
intuitions. At least some philosophers find that to be a welcome implication.  
 
Additionally, Cummins-type theories have a notoriously difficult time explaining the 
normativity of functions, by which I mean the fact that it is possible for something to 
possess a function without being able to perform that function (e.g., Neander 1991, 181-
2; though see Hardcastle 2002; Cummins et al. 2010). That is because, on Cummins’ 
view, the function of a trait is a disposition (Cummins 1975, 758). If a trait loses the 
disposition to perform a certain activity, then, at least on the classic view, it loses the 
function itself. In that case, how can a trait dysfunction? These two problems 
(overbreadth and normativity) provide some motivation for retaining an evolutionary 
perspective for thinking about function, but supplementing, rather than supplanting, that 
perspective with considerations drawn from mechanistic explanation.   
 
 
3. Hierarchical and Sequential Aspects of Function Indeterminacy  
 
Up until this point, I have largely described Neander’s solution, or re-described it 
slightly. Yet I propose to extend that solution in two ways. The first is fairly minor and 
the second more substantial. First, for Neander, the correct way of describing the function 
of an item (in cases of conflict, e.g., in the biomedical context) is in terms of what she 
calls the item’s “most specific function.” But I would prefer to speak of the item’s 
“differentiated function” (which is to be distinguished from the developmental process of 
“differentiation,” as in, e.g., cell differentiation). The phrase, “most specific function,” 
contains an ambiguity that can be clarified using the framework of mechanistic 
explanation.  
 
As she recognizes, the “most specific function” of an item can be described in at least 
two ways (Neander 1995, 118-119). From one perspective, we can describe the activity 
that the item produces without indicating how the activity contributes to the mechanism 
of which it is a part (for example, “the function of the heart is to beat”). From another 
perspective, we can merely indicate that the activity contributes to the activity of the 
mechanism of which the item is a part, without specifying the “intrinsic” nature of the 
activity (for example, “the function of the heart is to help circulate blood”). Craver (2001, 
65) makes the same distinction, and describes these in terms of the “isolated activity” and 
“contextual role” of an item. It seems to me that, from the biomedical perspective, the 
former ascription (“the heart beats”) is the more informative of the two, because the latter 
is overly generic: it does not differentiate the function of the heart from that of the other 
components of the circulatory system. Moreover, since we are envisioning the heart as a 
component within a mechanism for circulating blood, the fact that the heart contributes to 
blood circulation will be implicit in the models that we use to represent the mechanism. 
Instead of describing the item’s “most specific function,” then, I will describe the item’s 
“differentiated function.” Talking of the “differentiated function” of the heart brings to 
the front and center of attention that the heart is part of a system in which each part has a 
distinct, and different, causal role. It draws attention to what the heart does that differs 
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from what the other components do. The “differentiated function” of the heart, for 
example, is to beat, not to help circulate blood.  
 
Secondly, Neander describes the “most specific function” of the item as the activity that 
it can perform “more or less on its own”, rather than “in collaboration with other 
components” (118). Applied to the heart, the idea would be that the most specific 
function of the heart is to beat, rather than to circulate blood or to deliver nutrients to 
cells. However, in what sense is it true to say that the heart beats “more or less on its 
own?” Suppose that the function of the heart is to beat, but the heart stops beating, or 
stops beating at the appropriate rate, because, due to a lesion in the medulla, it is not 
receiving the proper impulses from the brain. Is the heart dysfunctional? Intuitively, it is 
not dysfunctional; rather, it has been placed in an abnormal circumstance in which it 
cannot perform its function. It has, as it were, merely been deprived of the right inputs, 
similar to an unplugged electrical toy. But it seems both counterintuitive, and 
counterproductive, to say that the heart is dysfunctional if it stops beating just because it 
is not receiving the right inputs. (Of course, there is one sense in which the heart beats 
“more or less on its own,” namely, that in which it may continue to beat very briefly after 
removal from the body, as after pithing a frog. But that phenomenon is pretty short-
lived!)  
 
So, there is no obvious sense in which beating is something the heart can do more or less 
on its own. It requires the right sorts of inputs from other sources. This suggests that, 
when we are attempting to articulate clearly the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional, it is not enough simply to point to its causal role within a hierarchy of 
mechanisms. Rather, we must also provide at least a “mechanism sketch” of the way in 
which the item interacts with others, at the same level, to produce the activity of the 
mechanism of which it is a part. We must adopt, not only a hierarchical (or vertical) 
perspective, but a sequential (or horizontal) perspective on the mechanism as well. In 
order to state clearly the conditions under which an item is dysfunctional, that item’s 
performing a function (e.g., the heart’s beating) must be seen as one stage in a productive 
sequence of activities that are collectively responsible for yielding the activity of the 
mechanism as a whole (blood circulation). In light of such a mechanism sketch, we have 
the tools to specify that the item is question is dysfunctional not only when it cannot 
perform its differentiated function, but when it cannot perform its differentiated function 
even when the other parts of the system have performed their own characteristic 
activities in their appropriate sequence (see Garson and Piccinini 2014). Thus, a full 
specification of the conditions under which an item is dysfunctional can be made so long 
as we have some characterization of both the hierarchical and the sequential aspects of 
the mechanism in which the item is embedded.  
 
To give a simple example: suppose we want to provide a mechanistic explanation for 
how the gut digests food. We would analyze it into several parts, such as the mouth, 
tongue, esophagus, stomach, small and large intestine, and anus, each with its 
differentiated function. Using the solution to the indeterminacy problem developed here, 
we could say that the function of the stomach is to break down food and transfer it to the 
duodenum. (Note that the stomach has several functions, for example, to protect the inner 
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organs from the highly corrosive acids it contains. Nothing in the solution to functional 
indeterminacy precludes the possibility that one trait or organ possesses several distinct 
functions, each associated with its own indeterministic “hierarchy.”) Suppose, however, 
at a given moment, the stomach is not digesting any food. That does not mean that it is 
dysfunctional. After all, it is possible that the animal is fasting and there is no food to 
digest. Functions are “situation specific” (Kingma 2010). It is only dysfunctional if it is 
not breaking down food and all of the preceding stages (e.g., functions) in the sequence 
of digestion have taken place (culminating with food being delivered by the esophagus to 
the stomach).  
 
A concern one might have with the introduction of this “horizontal” approach to defining 
dysfunction is that it appears, on the surface, to involve circularity. That is, we are trying 
to explain how it is that a trait can dysfunction (e.g., the stomach) and in so doing, we are 
appealing to the functions of the other parts of the system (e.g., the fact that the 
esophagus has discharged its function of bringing food to the stomach). But there is no 
circularity here. We first use the “vertical” approach to identify the determinate function 
of any given trait. That approach does not involve any apparent circularity because in 
order for me to identify the (determinate) function of the stomach (namely, to pass food 
along to the duodenum), I don’t have to have already identified the (determinate) 
functions of the other parts of the system. It is enough that I have identified their 
indeterminate functions.  
 
Once we have used that vertical method to identify the determinate functions of several 
components of a system, we can then deploy the “horizontal” perspective to identify 
precisely the conditions under which any given component is dysfunctional. At this stage 
(that is, in trying to understand when a part of the system is dysfunctional) we are free to 
make use of our knowledge of the determinate functions of the other parts of the system. 
What we are not allowed to do is to identify the determinate function of a component of a 
system by appealing to the determinate functions of the other parts of the system. What 
we are also not allowed to do is to identify the conditions under which an item is 
dysfunctional by appealing to the conditions under which some other item is 
dysfunctional. The approach I have outlined here avoids both sorts of circularity. In this 
way, the tools of mechanistic explanation help solve both of these aspects of the 
indeterminacy problem and allow us to state clearly when a given item is dysfunctional. 
More generally, this analysis suggests the importance of philosophical work on 
integrating considerations drawn from the traditional body of philosophical literature on 
biological function, and those drawn from the philosophical literature on mechanism.  
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